A Word of Caution In the past, some commentators have quoted from earlier versions of this essay as if it represented the original voice of Churchman. This is a misreading of my intent. Rather than aiming at a scholarly exegesis of West's work, I try to honor West by explaining the way I understand his thinking in my work on critical systems heuristics. As much as my work owes to West's influence and inspiration, it should be noted that critical heuristics is different in orientation and language from Churchman's systems approach; it is shaped by the contemporary revival, in Continental Europe, of practical philosophy, language analysis, and discourse theory, and by my subsequent effort to reconstruct the "systems approach" in the terms of practical reason and critical discourse. Please do not blur these differences.
Take this essay in the spirit in which I offer it, as a personal appreciation but certainly not as a shortcut to West's ideas, that is, to using or even quoting them without the indispensable effort of reading the original texts. Thank you.
Management as the Art of Designing Improvement
C. West Churchman is a management scientist of a rare sort. Management to him means more than it usually does in management science (allocation of resources); it means a philosophical challenge to our capabilities of understanding the ethics of whole systems.
Why ethics? Why whole systems? The essence of management is decision making; the hallmark of good decisions is that they promote some kind of desired improvement. But what constitutes an improvement? The concept raises fundamental epistemological and ethical issues. These issues are important to future-responsive management.
The Epistemological Crux: Comprehensiveness
How can we design improvement without appreciating the totality of conditions that will determine the quality of our decisions, for example, risks and chances, future opportunities, and expected distributions of different benefits and costs? In Churchman's (1968, p. 3) words, "How can we design improvement without understanding the whole system?" To Churchman, the question implies that conventional analytic patterns of decision making and problem solving need to be complemented by a "sweep-in" process (Singer 1957; Churchman 1982, p. 117 and pp. 125-132) , a systematic and selfcritical attempt to consider ever more aspects of the larger system -ideally, the totality of relevant conditions. Churchman has frequently illustrated the necessity of the process with the example of the inventory problem (1971, pp. 165-167; 1979, p. 45-46; 1982, pp. 12-15 and 130-132 ; see also Mason 1988, pp. 370-373) . As Churchman demonstrates, it is quite impossible to design an optimal inventory policy for a manufacturing plant without considering all conceivable alternatives to holding an inventory. The best of the forgone opportunities represents an inventory policy's opportunity costs.
How can we reasonably judge the degree to which an inventory policy is sound without knowing its opportunity costs? But any estimation of these opportunity costs bursts the definition of the inventory problem and requires us to investigate the larger system of the firm's opportunities. As the relatively simple inventory problem shows, we cannot rationally design improvement without assuming some theory about the nature of the total relevant system. It is obvious that the cognitive requirements of such a quest for comprehensiveness are enormous. It is one of the distinguishing characteristics of Churchman's work that he faces these requirements without taking refuge in any of the conventions of science that so often conveniently shelter theorists from the epistemological implications of the systems idea, for example, the conventions of bounded rationality and satisficing (Simon 1945 (Simon , 1957 (Simon , 1962 , of incrementalism (Dahl and Lindblom 1953) and of piecemeal social engineering (Popper 1966) . Mainstream systems literature somehow always manages to ignore the fact that no conceivable methodology can secure comprehensively rational problem solutions. Most authors seek to demonstrate how and why their systems approaches extend the bounds of rational explanation or design accepted in their fields.
Churchman never does. To him, the systems idea challenges us to undertake critical self-reflection. It compels him to question his understanding of problems -and of problem-solving methods -but does not tempt him to claim to have the answers. His way of helping us is to suggest questions, not answers. Accordingly, for him the crucial task in promoting better decisionmaking is not to prove ever more analytical tools for solving problems but rather to develop the tools we lack for systematic reflection and debate about the shortcomings and sources of deception contained in a proposed solution, or in the underlying definition of the problem. This is the task that Churchman seeks to accomplish with his dialectical systems approach, which is in noteworthy distinction to the usual problem-solving stance of applied scientists (for further discussion, see Ulrich 1980; 1988a The question is frequently considered to be of little relevance to applied science, as its business is understood to be one of securing the choice of efficient means for given ends. Thus management science is expected to apply rigor to the problem of optimal allocation of resources while referring the selection of ends to those who have the legitimation and power to decide.
More than any other author in the fields of management science, operations research, and systems thinking, Churchman has admonished us that this kind of answer is inadequate.
It is true, the original intent underlying this separation of the choice of means from the choice of ends is a self-critical one: science must not misunderstand itself as a source of legitimation for value judgments on adequate ends.
Science cannot justify such judgments, hence it must refrain from introducing into its propositions value judgments of its own. The problem with this self-restriction of science is not so much that the question of proper ends remains unanswered but rather that its self-restriction to the instrumental question of the proper use of resources for given ends does not buy as much immunity from value judgments as is generally assumed. The choice of means cannot be kept value-free simply by identifying all value judgments with the choice of ends and then referring the choice of ends to an extra-scientific domain. This becomes clear as soon as we consider the fact that alternative means to reach a given end may have different practical implications for those affected by the measures taken. As an example, different policies to obtain an adequate energy supply for a given region, say by means of fossil or nuclear energy production, will impose different risks and costs to different population groups, including the future generations.
That is to say, decisions about means, just like decisions about ends, have a normative content that is in need of both ethical reflection and democratic legitimation. By its own standards of rigor, management science will have to acknowledge that its propositions burst its own methodological framework: the meaning of optimization (or simulation or other modeling approaches to securing improvement) remains unclear, and threatens to become a hidden source of suboptimization, without clear -and valid -standards of improvement. In a world of conflicting values, needs, and interests, the most scarce of all resources in optimization is ethically defensible agreement on the standards of improvement, but no conceivable method of optimization can secure such agreement. This is why a dialectical systems approach of the kind pursued by Churchman -an approach that does not seek to avoid the problem of the ethics of whole systems -is so fundamental if "normal" management science is to achieve its purpose, even though the two approaches may seem irreconcilably different in their orientation and language. But now, to the specific idea of a future-responsive management science. What are the specific difficulties to be considered when the task is to secure improvement in the future? What can we say about these difficulties in light of the previous discussion? What kind of systems approach -and perhaps, of management science -could possibly do justice to these difficulties?
What Is Future-Responsive Management? Three Concerns Churchman (1970) once defined operations research as "the securing of improvement in social systems by means of the scientific method," whereby securing mainly referred to implementation. Later, the meaning of securing changed. In recent years, Churchman preferred to characterize his interest in terms of "social systems design, the effort to improve social systems through planning" (1982b, p. 129). He explains:
"The design of my philosophical life is based on an examination of the following question: is it possible to secure improvement in the human condition by means of the human intellect? The verb "to secure" is (for me) terribly important, because . . . problem solving often appears to produce improvement, but the so-called 'solution' often makes matters worse in the larger system (e.g., many food programs of the last century may well have made world-wide starvation even worse than no food C. W. Churchman (ca. 1970) . Photograph (edited) appeared on the covers of the books The Design of Inquiring Systems (Basic Books, programs would have done). The verb "to secure" means that in the larger system over time the improvement persists." (1982, pp. 19-20) In this last definition, the sweep-in process has been expanded to include the larger system over time; adequate standards of improvement now are to be oriented toward the ideal of improvement that persists. Ever since, in his understanding of management and planning, Churchman has shown a strong concern for what more recently -particularly in developmental and environmental studies as well as in future research -has come to be designated the ideal of sustainability.
According to this ideal, we should consider our policies and designs for improvement critically with regard to long-term environmental and developmental implications, so as to make sure that they promote ecologically viable and socioeconomically as well as socioculturally desirable conditions. This idea can usefully be applied to our conceptions of sound (rational) management in the private or in the public sector. If one thinks in the long run, it would be appropriate to speak of "sustainable management" in this context, but the term might be perceived to be a bit provocative and, more important, it might be misunderstood, as the crucial point of reference is not the survival of present conceptions of management but the survival of the planetary ecosystem, along with the perspectives that future generations will inherit from us. For this reason, I prefer to speak of future-responsive management.
I cannot give an adequate rendering of Churchman's ideas about futureresponsive management. I will suggest three main concerns that I link to the idea of future-responsive management and discuss these concerns with special regard for some of Churchman's basic ideas.
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Concern No. 1: The Difficult Cognitive Requirements of a Predictive Approach to the Future -Toward a Different Kind of Future Discourse
For the first time in the history of humanity, our technological potential reaches far beyond the foreseeable future. The causal scale of our technologies, designs, and policies is no longer matched by the reach of our knowledge and understanding. Yet understanding the long-term implications of our actions and omissions -the way they may affect, for instance, the environmental and social conditions of future generations -appears to be the only way to secure "improvement that persists over time in the larger system." How else can we act responsibly in the face of an uncertain future?
On the other hand, if one doesn't want to assume that we can forecast the future, the sweep-in process seems to become a hopeless undertaking, as much as it appears epistemologically necessary. Need we conclude that if we take the systems idea seriously, we are bound to end up with inaction, if not mental breakdown, and ultimately with a bottomless epistemological and ethical skepticism?
The answer for me is no, although I confess that Churchman's "heroic" stance sometimes leaves me dismayed. It is such a tall order! But I think it is only so long as we try to sweep in the future in terms of a forecasting approach (that is, in terms of empirical science) that the quest for futureresponsive management must remain chimerical. Apart from the usual focus on this empirical-predictive dimension of the future discourse, there are other ways to conceive of future-responsive management. By challenging cultural assumptions, we make the sweep-in process meaningful without losing practicability. We can then pursue the quest for comprehensiveness by uncovering alternative contexts of meaning (interpreting "facts") rather than by extending our knowledge in an empirical-predictive sense (technical scope of forecasting). No impossible cognitive requirements are involved in such an effort, for it aims not at allencompassing knowledge but only at better (mutual) understanding. That is to say, it requires not so much an unbounded exploration of an ever-growing larger system over time but rather a sincere effort to ensure authentic and unhampered communication.
Unfortunately, Churchman's preferred example of the problem of opportunity costs and his emphasis on the heroic aspects of the sweep-in process appear to have caused many of his readers to understand the process chiefly in terms of empirical science and forecasting, which makes it such a hopeless undertaking. Perhaps this misunderstanding explains why his dialectical systems thinking, although well known, has not reached most management scientists and decision makers. But there is actually no need to limit the sweep-in process to the empirical-predictive dimension of the future discourse, nor is it Churchman's intention to do so.
I believe that Churchman's systems thinking, if applied to the cultural dimension of the future discourse, is apt to promote a different, culturally self-aware kind of future research. I think, for instance, of the systematic place that Churchman (1979) gives to the enemies of the systems approach.
Bringing in the enemies -rather than just the experts and perhaps the stakeholders -might give quite a different quality to future studies and planning efforts. We might conceive of institutional arrangements that would enable concerned citizens to confront proposed designs with culturally different future visions, or, in Churchman's terms, with alternative kinds of "ideal planning." I also find Ackoff's (1974 Ackoff's ( , 1981 ) related concepts of "idealized design" and "redesigning the future" important in this respect.
Regarding the question of institutional arrangements, we need new arenas of participatory problem unfolding and conflict resolution to cultivate this new kind of future discourse. One such arrangement has been suggested and practically tested by Peter Dienel (1989 Dienel ( , 1991 in Germany, namely, the "planning cell" (Planungszelle). It has been successfully used for developing citizen reports on technological projects (Bürgergutachten). Using statistical rules for random sampling or other procedures that ensure a representation of different concerns, a government body invites citizens to serve on a committee that examines design proposals and comes up with suggestions for better designs.
If such forms of participatory problem solving are to make a real difference, I think it is important that we help the participants to free themselves from prevailing conceptions of expertise and that we provide them with the tools Page 8 of 17 Towards future-responsive management -an essay in honor of C.W. Churchman 26.03.2009 http://geocities.com/csh_home/frm.html they need to argue their concerns in an authentic, openly subjective but nevertheless cogent, way. Hence another, third, dimension of the sweep-in process is the critical-emancipatory dimension. The sweep-in process can generally be understood as a means of rendering the participants more aware of, and more competent to challenge, previously unquestioned (because seemingly natural or given) constraints, for example, with regard to the distribution of benefits and negative consequences of a proposed action, or with regard to the distribution of power and resources, including the access to information, expertise, and skills, among those concerned. Authentic mutual understanding, as fostered by the effort of sweeping in the cultural dimension, does not by itself secure conditions of equal participation (doing justice to all those involved), nor can it guarantee ethically justified consensus (doing justice to all those not involved but potentially affected).
The step from understanding to critique is as important as the previous shift Traditional ethics is individualistic and volitional in its outlook, that is, it relies on the moral conscience and judgment of individual agents. It identifies moral action with individually good action: the moral quality of an action is taken to be measurable either by an agent's good will (as in Kant's (1786 Kant's ( , 1788 ) ethics of duty) or by his or her assuming personal responsibility for those who may be affected by the action (as in Max Weber's (1973) ethics of responsibility). To my knowledge, West Churchman is the first philosopher who has seen very clearly the systems-theoretical deficiency of this approach to ethics: it cannot secure improvement, for the measure of improvement must be applied to the whole system. We cannot understand individual morality without understanding the total relevant system that is to serve as a point of reference for defining improvement! Individualistic ethics originally had its merits, of course: it was apt to keep the cognitive requirements of moral judgment low. It assumed that the consequences of an action were largely foreseeable and unequivocal to an agent of good will, as they occurred within a time horizon and a geographical space (and normally also a social life-world) that were shared by the agent and those affected. Accordingly, every agent could be assumed to be able to judge the moral quality of his or her actions. Even in the awakening age of the Enlightenment, Kant could thus still declare a "good will" to be a sufficient requirement for moral judgment.
But things have changed. Today, good will and good judgment no longer converge so easily. The causal scale of our actions has extended to include world-wide connected socioeconomic processes (for example, economic recession, unemployment, and poverty), long-term social costs that may be imposed on future generations (for example, the health risks of radioactive wastes), and complex and irreversible environmental effects that threaten the survival of the global ecosphere (for example, the greenhouse effect). That is to say, one now often needs extensive knowledge to anticipate and assess an action's impacts. The once clear-cut boundary between ethics and expertise has become blurred and difficult to draw. An adequate "ethics of an endangered future" (Jonas 1976 ) must adapt to this situation. Ethics can no longer be kept knowledge-free, as it were. Quite the contrary, the old moral duty of sustaining a moral conscience (a good will) has been superseded by a new moral duty of being knowledgeable, in the sense that the scale of our designs and that of our knowledge must match.
This new moral duty of being knowledgeable is further complicated by the insight that those who cannot speak for themselves, because they are not yet born (the future generations) or are otherwise handicapped (for example, the fauna and flora of whole ecosystems), must be part of the community of concerned parties considered. A future-responsive ethics must consider the harm or improvement caused in the whole system. Churchman's concept of a whole systems ethics is apt in this context, as it reminds us of the intrinsic connection between ethical and systems thinking. Table 1 contrasts some of the mentioned limitations of the old ethics with the requirements of a new, future-responsive ethics.
Aspect

Old ethics New ethics
Focus (object of ethical judgment)
Individualistic ethics: The moral quality of an agent's individual action is evaluated.
Whole systems ethics:
The improvement of the whole system is evaluated.
Critical instance of ethical judgment
Volitional ethics: Good will and personal responsibility ("conscience") are the crucial issues of moral competence.
Cognitivist ethics:
Understanding based on knowledge ("con scientia") of the total relevant system is the crucial issue of moral competence.
Cognitive requirements Low cognitive requirements: can be met by all people of good will without requiring any special expertise ("knowledge-free" ethics of certainty).
High cognitive requirements:
A sweep-in process is needed to appreciate the whole-systems implications of an action from different viewpoints; collective expertise is required (Knowledge-based ethics of uncertainty).
Reach with respect to the future
Ethics of immediacy:
The consequences of an action can be known and judged from experience, as the agent and those affected or concerned share a present, geographical space and social life-world.
Ethics of remoteness:
The consequences of an action may not be known from experience; the agent and those affected or concerned need not share a present, geographical space and social life-world.
Reach with respect to environmental concerns
Anthropocentric ethics: Nature is not an object of human responsibility, it is beyond the reach of human intervention and cares for itself.
Universal ethics: Nature has become an object of human responsibility, as the causal scale of our policies and technologies has become global. The old ethics are based on the notion that the acting individual can judge the moral quality of his or her action from experience ("conscience") while in the new ethics, understanding the whole system (acting "con scientia") becomes a crucial moral requirement.
A future-responsive ethics can no longer be a volitional ethics but must be understood in terms of a cognitivist ethics; it will raise epistemological difficulties similar to those of the sweep-in process. The implication, then, appears to be a new moral skepticism. The difficulty is not the systems idea but rather the expanding connectedness of the world in which we live.
Corresponding to our previous conclusions regarding the empiricalpredictive dimension of the future discourse, we need new strategies for reducing the cognitive requirements of a future-responsive ethics. We must find ways to render ordinary men and women once again capable of adequate moral judgment. One way toward this goal might consist in a critical turn in ethics, that is, a critical systems ethics.
From this perspective, the question is not so much whether our ethics are whole systems ethics but rather, whether they are critically oriented ethics: A critical turn of our understanding of systems rationality is in order. In The Systems Approach and Its Enemies, Churchman (1979) taught us essential lessons about such a critical turn. I understand the book's basic message thus:
The concept of systems rationality that will help us to secure improvement is one that clearly acknowledges its own lack of comprehensiveness as a necessary condition of critically tenable practice.
This notion of a nonrationalistic, because self-limiting, concept of rationality (Ulrich 1983, pp. 34 and 278) for me marks an important turning point in the recent history of systems theory: it represents a shift from "precritical" hard and soft systems thinking to critical systems thinking. From this new perspective, the implication of the systems idea is not that we must understand the whole system but rather that we need to deal critically with the fact that we never do. As I tried to show in Critical Heuristics, the systems idea, once we begin to understand it in this sense, will remind us of the un(w)holy character of our systems maps and designs. It can also provide a methodological basis for developing tools of critical reflection -conceptual tools that can help us systematically to uncover the inevitable incomprehensiveness or selectivity of designs. To this purpose, critical systems heuristics offers both a conceptual framework and forms of cogent argumentation. To the conceptual framework belong some basic criticallyheuristic ideas and pragmatic mapping categories (1983, pp. 244-264) as well as a checklist of boundary questions (1987, pp. 279-280; 1993, pp. 596-598) . To the forms of argumentation belong a basic model of purposeful systems assessment (1983, pp. 341-342) , the process of unfolding (1983, chapter 5; operationalized in 1988b, pp. 426-427) , and the polemical employment of boundary judgments (1983, pp. 305-310; 1993, 599-603) .
(For introductory overviews see .)
The critical turn, and specifically the development of an operational framework for critically-heuristic debate on the shortcomings and implications of systems designs, is far from being accomplished. I hope that others will join me in this effort. Let us put the systems idea to work on the job of dealing rationally with everyday conditions of imperfect rationality, rather than dreaming the impossible dream of comprehensive rationality.
Conclusion
Can we secure future-responsive management through systems thinking and design? The answer, it seems to me, must be a self-critical "no," followed by a challenging "however."
No, because the systems idea, by helping us to better understand the crucial epistemological and ethical difficulties of securing improvement that persists, does not automatically remove these difficulties. The difficulties in question -the epistemological necessity of the quest for comprehensiveness, However, skepticism provides no solution. It merely serves to immunize mistaken claims to rationality against critical debate. The fact that reason cannot secure comprehensive rationality provides no sound argument against a systematic effort to promote critical awareness with respect to our failure to be comprehensively rational. In particular, it will not help to reject the systems idea because of its difficult implications, as if it caused the difficulties of which it reminds us. The systems idea is neither the cause nor the solution of the problem, it is only the messenger. Accusing the messenger of the bad news will help as little as ignoring the news.
The only reasonable response is to take the messenger seriously and to listen carefully to what it has to say, so as to understand its message as well as possible. To the extent that we take the systems idea seriously, we will begin to understand its critical implications and will thereby gain awareness of our failure to be comprehensive. Such awareness may ultimately be the only method available for ordinary planners and decision makers to become more future-responsive. Uncovering the lack of comprehensiveness -the unavoidable selectivity -of our designs and then systematically tracing the
